ROBINSON, J.

This certified appeal raises significant questions about the breadth and extent of a law enforcement agency's disclosure obligations under the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq.,1 with respect to a pending criminal prosecution. In 1993, this court held in Gifford v. Freedom of Information Commission, 227 Conn. 641, 653-61, 631 A.2d 252 (1993), that during a pending criminal prosecution, a law enforcement agency's disclosure obligations under the act were exclusively governed by the statutory predecessor to General Statutes § 1-215,2 which required the agency to release, at that time, only what is commonly known as the police blotter information, namely, "the `name and address of the person arrested, the date, time and place of the arrest and the offense for which the person was arrested.'" Id., at 658, 631 A.2d 252. The legislature responded to Gifford by enacting Public Acts 1994, No. 94-246, § 13,3 which amended General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 1-20b, the statutory predecessor to § 1-215, to require the police to designate for release, in addition to the police blotter information, "at least one of the following ... the arrest report, incident report, news release or other similar report of the arrest of a person." See footnote 2 of this opinion. In this appeal, we must determine whether the enactment of Public Act 94-246 legislatively overruled this court's temporal conclusion in Gifford, namely, that during pending criminal prosecutions, law enforcement agencies' disclosure obligations under the act are exclusively governed by § 1-215, rendering the act's broader disclosure requirement and law enforcement exception, set forth in General Statutes (Supp.2014) § 1-210(a) and (b)(3) respectively,4 inapplicable from the time of arrest to the conclusion of the prosecution.

The defendant, the Freedom of Information Commission (commission), appeals, upon our grant of its petition for certification,5 from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's judgment sustaining the administrative appeal of the plaintiff, the Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety (department),6 from the commission's decision finding that the department had violated the act by failing to disclose to the complainants7 certain records from a pending criminal case. Commissioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, 137 Conn.App. 307, 308-309, 48 A.3d 694 (2012). Supported by the amici curiae,8 the commission claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the enactment of Public Act 94-246 did not affect aspects of this court's decision in Gifford v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 227 Conn. at 641, 631 A.2d 252, holding that § 1-215 exclusively governed law enforcement agencies' disclosure obligations under the act during pending criminal prosecutions, because: (1) that construction is contrary to the plain language and legislative history of the statute, particularly the reference in § 1-215(a) providing that "disclosure of data or information other than [the police blotter information] set forth in [§ 1-215(b)(1)]... shall be subject to the provisions of [§ 1-210(b)(3)]"; and (2) the commission's interpretation of the act to the contrary is time-tested and reasonable and, therefore, entitled to deference from the courts. We conclude that Public Act 94-246 responded to Gifford by increasing law enforcement agencies' disclosure obligations under § 1-215, but did not disturb the holding in Gifford that § 1-215 exclusively governs law enforcement agencies' disclosure obligations under the act during pending criminal prosecutions, to the exclusion of the act's broader disclosure obligations set forth in § 1-210(a), as cabined by the law enforcement exception, set forth in § 1-210(b)(3). On the basis of the ample extratextual evidence of the meaning of the otherwise ambiguous § 1-215, we further conclude that the commission's construction of the statute to the contrary is not reasonable and, therefore, is not entitled to judicial deference. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court's opinion aptly sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history. "On March 18, 2008, the complainants requested, pursuant to the [act]... that the department provide them with access to the police report of an incident that occurred on March 15, 2008, in Derby. The request concerned the arrest of an individual who ... was charged with assault in the first degree of an elderly person and attempt to commit murder. On April 29, 2008, the department responded by letter indicating that the entire report was exempt from disclosure pursuant to § 1-215; however, the department provided the complainants with a copy of the official department ... press release pertaining to the incident that was the subject of their inquiry. The press release contained the following information: the accused's name was Toai T. Nguyen, he lived at 59 Grove Street, Shelton, and was born on March 4, 1973; the date, time and location of the incident was March 15, 2008, at 1:01 p.m. on Route 8, northbound, exit seventeen off ramp in Derby; and the charges upon which the accused had been arrested were: assault in the first degree of an elderly person in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59a, attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a, and failure to respond/plea in violation of General Statutes § 51-164r (a). The press release also contained a two paragraph narrative that included additional information about the arrest.

"On May 2, 2008, the complainants appealed from the decision of the department to the commission pursuant to General Statutes § 1-206(b)(1). On March 6, 2009, following a hearing, a decision by a hearing officer, and a proceeding before the full commission, the commission issued a final decision. In that decision, the commission concluded, among other things, that § 1-215 `does not exempt records from public disclosure under the [act], but rather mandates that, at a minimum, certain arrest records must be disclosed. In instances where a public agency seeks to withhold other records not mandated to be disclosed pursuant to § 1-215 ... such public agency must prove that an exemption applies to such other records.' The commission also found `that the [department] did make available to the [complainants] a press release concerning the arrest of [Nguyen], which included the name and address of [Nguyen], the date, time and place of his arrest and the offense for which he was arrested.' The commission then concluded `that the [department] provided the `record of arrest' within the meaning of § 1-215....'

"The commission issued the following orders: `Forthwith the [department] shall provide to the [complainants] copies of the in camera records other than the portions described in paragraphs 16, 25, 38 and 39 of the findings, above.... Consistent with [the commission's] precedent, the [department] may redact social security numbers from the records ordered released.'

"On March 12, 2009, the department filed an appeal with the trial court. On March 12, 2010, the commission informed the court that the criminal defendant had entered a guilty plea and the criminal matter therefore had concluded. The department then made all relevant documents available to the complainants. The court issued its memorandum of decision on April 21, 2010. The court agreed with both parties that the issue of the availability of the exception to the act provided by § 1-215 was moot, but because it was capable of repetition, yet evading review, the case could still go forward. The court also concluded that there was more than one reasonable interpretation of § 1-215, and therefore it consulted legislative history. The court stated that its conclusion from reviewing the legislative history `agrees with the [department's] position — that while Gifford [v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 227 Conn. at 641, 631 A.2d 252] had restricted disclosure to mere nominal information, the legislative revision had compromised on increasing the mandatory disclosure by police departments of arrest information by requiring the police department to disclose at least one of the four items listed in § 1-215(b)(2). Thus, [the department] here satisfied the act by choosing to provide the complainants with the news release, and was not obligated to make either a full or redacted police report available.'" (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Commissioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 137 Conn. App. at 309-11, 48 A.3d 694.

The commission appealed from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the department's administrative appeal to the Appellate Court. Id., at 311, 48 A.3d 694. In a unanimous opinion, the Appellate Court concluded that, when § 1-215 is considered in light of this court's interpretation of that statute in Gifford v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 227 Conn. at 641, 631 A.2d 252, and other related statutes, "there is only one plausible meaning of the statutory language. Therefore, we conclude that the statute's language is plain and unambiguous.... Because ... the plain language of the statute requires only the disclosure of the police blotter information of § 1-215(b)(1) and an additional piece of information contained in § 1-215(b)(2), we also must conclude that the court did not err in its conclusion that the news release disclosed by the department met the requirements of the statute." (Footnote omitted.) Commissioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 137 Conn.App. at 322-23, 48 A.3d 694. In particular, the Appellate Court observed that, although the amendment of the statute in 1994 "clearly overrules the Gifford court's holding that all § [1-215] required was the disclosure of the police blotter information," it did not void "the Gifford court's reasoning that ... § 1-215, exclusively regulates the disclosure of records of law enforcement agencies...."9 Id., at 321, 48 A.3d 694. This certified appeal followed. See footnote 5 of this opinion.

On appeal, the commission contends that the Appellate Court improperly: (1) interpreted § 1-215; and (2) failed to defer to the commission's reasonable, timetested interpretation of that statute. We address each claim in turn.10

I

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF § 1-215

We begin with the commission's claim that the Appellate Court's interpretation of § 1-215 is inconsistent with the statute's plain and unambiguous text, as well as the relevant legislative history. With respect to the plain language, the commission contends that the text of the statute indicates that it governs only the disclosure of "the record of the arrest," which is a term specifically defined by § 1-215(b) to include the police blotter information in § 1-215(b)(1) and an additional item listed in § 1-215(b)(2). As a corollary, the commission contends that the disclosure of all other law enforcement records "outside the ambit" of § 1-215, such as mug shots, documentary evidence, witness statements, and other reports, is governed by § 1-210(a) and (b)(3). (Emphasis omitted.) Thus, the commission contends that the reference in § 1-215(a) to the law enforcement exception, § 1-210(b)(3), is intended to indicate that § 1-210(b)(3) governs law enforcement disclosure obligations for all material except for the police blotter information defined under § 1-215(b)(1). The commission also contends that the legislature enacted the statutory language at issue in 1994 to overrule this court's interpretation of the statute's predecessor in Gifford v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 227 Conn. at 653-62, 631 A.2d 252, and that § 1-215 imposes a minimum level of disclosure at the time of arrest, without affecting law enforcement agencies' existing obligations under § 1-210(a) and (b)(3). To this end, the commission emphasizes that it is not arguing that "additional disclosures must be made, but [rather] that law enforcement agencies must be required to articulate a factual and legal reason why such disclosures would be prejudicial to a pending prosecution or are otherwise permissibly exempt from disclosure under § 1-210(b)(3)."11 In sum, the commission asks us to determine whether "good public policy supports an absolute exclusion from review of any law enforcement records during a criminal prosecution, once the minimal police blotter and press release disclosures have been made."12

In response, the department contends that the Appellate Court properly determined that § 1-215 plainly and unambiguously prescribes a law enforcement agency's exclusive disclosure obligations under the act during a pending prosecution, limiting that disclosure to the police blotter information under § 1-215(b)(1) and one of the items prescribed in subsection (b)(2). According to the department, "nothing in the statute compels a law enforcement agency to release all documents relating to an arrest." Relying on the language in § 1-215(b)(2) authorizing law enforcement agencies to "designat[e]" the additional item to be disclosed beyond the blotter information, the department cites the commission's interpretation of § 1-215 in Green v. Hartford Police Dept., Freedom of Information Commission, Docket No. FIC 1998-029 (July 22, 1998), and argues that the statute gives law enforcement agencies "exclusive discretion in choosing which source of additional information to disclose" under § 1-215(b)(2). To this end, the department contends that the reference in § 1-215(a) to the law enforcement exception, set forth in § 1-210(b)(3), does not indicate that § 1-210(b)(3) governs law enforcement agencies' disclosure obligations beyond those documents that comprise the "`record of the arrest'" defined by § 1-215(b), but rather, guides the agency in the exercise of its discretion while supplying the additional item required by § 1-215(b)(2), by authorizing the redaction or withholding of certain sensitive information.13 The department then claims that, even assuming that we deem § 1-215 to be ambiguous, the relevant legislative history supports the Appellate Court's interpretation, and suggests that the legislature enacted Public Act 94-246 as a compromise measure, and "did not intend to make substantial changes to the statutory language litigated in Gifford," by requiring law enforcement agencies to release a "salient" narrative along with the basic blotter information. We agree with the department, and conclude that, even after the legislature's post-Gifford amendments in 1994, § 1-215 continues to provide the exclusive disclosure obligation under the act for law enforcement agencies with respect to documents relating to a pending criminal prosecution.

"This court reviews the trial court's judgment pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq. Under the UAPA, it is [not] the function ... of this court to retry the case or to substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.... Even for conclusions of law, [t]he court's ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse if its discretion.... [Thus] [c]onclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts.... [Similarly], this court affords deference to the construction of a statute applied by the administrative agency empowered by law to carry out the statute's purposes.... Cases that present pure questions of law, however, invoke a broader standard of review than is ... involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion.... Furthermore, when a state agency's determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny ... the agency is not entitled to special deference.... We have determined, therefore, that the traditional deference accorded to an agency's interpretation of a statutory term is unwarranted when the construction of a statute ... has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny [or to] ... a governmental agency's time-tested interpretation...." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Chairperson, Connecticut Medical Examining Board v. Freedom of Information Commission, 310 Conn. 276, 281-82, 77 A.3d 121 (2013). Even if time-tested, we will defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute only if it is "reasonable"; that reasonableness is determined by "appl[ication of] our established rules of statutory construction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public Safety v. State Board of Labor Relations, 296 Conn. 594, 599, 996 A.2d 729 (2010).

"When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.... The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.... When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chairperson, Connecticut Medical Examining Board v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 310 Conn. at 283, 77 A.3d 121. The question of statutory interpretation presented in this case is a question of law subject to plenary review. See id., at 282-83, 77 A.3d 121.

A

Background: Gifford v. Freedom of Information Commission

"[I]n interpreting [statutory] language... we do not write on a clean slate, but are bound by our previous judicial interpretations of this language and the purpose of the statute." New England Road, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 308 Conn. 180, 186, 61 A.3d 505 (2013). Thus, determining the meaning and purpose of § 1-215 must begin with a detailed review of this court's 1993 decision in Gifford v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 227 Conn. at 641, 631 A.2d 252, which provided the impetus for the legislature's enactment of the statutory language at issue in this appeal. In Gifford, this court considered "whether a municipal police department arrest report must be disclosed by the police department to the public, pursuant to the [act]... while the criminal prosecution that is related to the arrest report is pending." (Citation omitted.) Id., at 642, 631 A.2d 252. Assuming that an arrest report is a public record subject to the act, the court determined that the 1993 revision of the predecessor statute to § 1-21514 "does not mandate disclosure of an arrest report in these circumstances," specifically, "while the criminal prosecution related to the report is pending."15 Id., at 653, 631 A.2d 252. The court first parsed the statute's language in detail, determining that a phrase in its first sentence, "`[n]otwithstanding any provision of the general statutes to the contrary,'" demonstrates that "a document falling within this section that would otherwise be governed by other portions of the act, or by any other provision of the General Statutes, is nonetheless governed, not by those other provisions, but by this provision." (Emphasis altered; footnotes omitted.) Id., at 654, 631 A.2d 252. The court stated that the statute's "first sentence... by itself, establishes a broad disclosure requirement" with respect to arrest reports; id., at 655, 631 A.2d 252; but it "cannot be read in isolation from the second sentence of that provision.... The second sentence limits the language of the first sentence by limiting the `record of the arrest of any person' — which we interpret to include an arrest report — to the `name and address of the person arrested, the date, time and place of the arrest and the offense for which the person was arrested.' We conclude that this language must be read as a limitation on the broad disclosure requirement of the first sentence, because otherwise it would have been unnecessary for the legislature to have included such language.... Moreover, this reading is consistent with the rule of statutory construction known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius ... which may be translated as `the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.'" (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Id., at 658, 631 A.2d 252. Thus, the court concluded that § 1-215 "exclusively regulates the disclosure of arrest reports, and obligates a police department to disclose such a report only to the extent provided by the second sentence of that provision." (Emphasis added.) Id., at 658-59, 631 A.2d 252; see also id., at 661, 631 A.2d 252 (describing § 1-215 as "salient example of the maxim of statutory construction that specific language covering the given subject matter, namely, the disclosure requirements for arrest reports, will prevail over general language of the same or another statute that might otherwise prove controlling"). The court further noted that this reading "dovetails" with the language of § 1-210(a), which provides for disclosure "`[e]xcept as otherwise provided by any ... state statute,'" and noted that § 1-215 is such a "`state statute.'"16 Id., at 662, 631 A.2d 252.

In responding to the dissenting justices' argument that its interpretation of § 1-215 rendered superfluous the law enforcement exceptions set forth in § 1-210(b)(3) to the general disclosure obligation under § 1-210(a) of the act,17 the majority of this court in Gifford "recognize[d] that the language of § [1-210](b)(3) ... could be interpreted to include arrest reports. This language, however, does not explicitly include a reference to arrest reports, and could be interpreted to cover other documents besides arrest reports that are maintained by a law enforcement agency and are not otherwise available to the public. Although there is no need to hypothesize what other documents may be covered by § [1-210](b)(3), we conclude that the explicit reference to arrest reports in § [1-215] removes such documents from the coverage of § [1-210](b)(3), and provides both the disclosure obligations for such reports and the appropriate limitations on that disclosure. As a result, our interpretation does not render § [1-210](b)(3) superfluous because, absent some other statutory provision shielding law enforcement documents from disclosure, that provision continues to regulate the disclosure of law enforcement documents other than arrest reports during the pendency of a criminal case."18 (Citation omitted; emphasis altered.) Id., at 654-55 n. 14, 631 A.2d 252.

B

Textual Analysis

Bearing in mind this court's interpretation of its predecessor in Gifford, we turn to the text of § 1-215, which provides: "(a) Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes to the contrary, and except as otherwise provided in this section, any record of the arrest of any person, other than a juvenile, except a record erased pursuant to chapter 961a, shall be a public record from the time of such arrest and shall be disclosed in accordance with the provisions of section 1-212 and subsection (a) of section 1-210, except that disclosure of data or information other than that set forth in subdivision (1) of subsection (b) of this section shall be subject to the provisions of subdivision (3) of subsection (b) of section 1-210. Any personal possessions or effects found on a person at the time of such person's arrest shall not be disclosed unless such possessions or effects are relevant to the crime for which such person was arrested.

"(b) For the purposes of this section, `record of the arrest' means (1) the name and address of the person arrested, the date, time and place of the arrest and the offense for which the person was arrested, and (2) at least one of the following, designated by the law enforcement agency: The arrest report, incident report, news release or other similar report of the arrest of a person." (Emphasis added.)

In contrast to the Appellate Court, we agree with the trial court that both parties' proffered interpretations of § 1-215, when read in the context of related statutes, including § 1-210, in accordance with § 1-2z, are reasonable and that the statutory scheme is, therefore, ambiguous. Specifically, we deem plausible the commission's reading of the statute's plain language, which suggests that § 1-215 pertains only to defined arrest records in particular and that the disclosure of other records of law enforcement agencies — including those that pertain to pending prosecutions — are governed by § 1-210(a), as cabined by the law enforcement exceptions set forth in § 1-210(b)(3). This is particularly so given the lack of statutory language in § 1-215 expressly referring to pending criminal prosecutions. We also find reasonable, however, the department's reading of the statutory text, namely, that § 1-215 exclusively governs disclosure under the act of law enforcement agencies' records during pending criminal prosecutions, particularly in light of this court's interpretation of identically worded aspects of the statutory predecessor to § 1-215 in Gifford v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 227 Conn. at 641, 631 A.2d 252. That reading would render the police blotter information defined by § 1-215(b)(1) subject to complete disclosure under §§ 1-215(a) and 1-210(a), along with one item described in § 1-215(b)(2), as designated by the law enforcement agency, the content of which may be circumscribed in accordance with § 1-210(b)(3).19 Accordingly, pursuant to § 1-2z, we turn to extratextual sources, including the legislative history, to determine the legislature's intention in enacting and amending § 1-215.

C

Extratextual Sources

In the session following the publication of this court's decision in Gifford, the legislature enacted Public Act 94-246, which, inter alia, created the provisions of § 1-215 that are at issue in the present case.20 The legislative history of Public Act 94-246 demonstrates that it is a product of compromise that is not, contrary to the arguments of the commission, a wholesale rejection of the statutory analysis in Gifford. The provisions of Public Act 94-246 relevant to the present case were originally introduced in the Senate as an amendment to House Bill No. 5789, 1994 Sess. (Senate Amendment A), on April 28, 1994.21 A primary distinguishing feature of Senate Amendment A was that it required the police to disclose both the blotter information and "the arrest report, incident report or any similar report of the arrest of a person." Moreover, the Senate Amendment A did not offer the option of a news release or make clear that the choice of which document to disclose remained in the discretion of the law enforcement agency. See footnote 21 of this opinion. The legislative debate in the Senate about Senate Amendment A reflected a tension between its opponents, who endorsed the holding in Gifford as responsive to the investigative and public safety needs of law enforcement, exemplified by the remarks of Senator William DiBella;22 see 37 S. Proc., Pt. 6, 1994 Sess., pp. 1961-69; and its supporters, including Senator George Jepsen, its sponsor, who viewed Senate Amendment A as an important weapon for protecting citizens from police abuses and restoring what had been a past practice of the free disclosure of arrest related information.23 See id., at pp. 1964-65. Ultimately, Senator DiBella's motion to reject Senate Amendment A failed twenty-two to eleven, with three Senators absent. See id., at pp. 1983-84. The entire bill then passed the Senate unanimously as amended and moved to the House of Representatives. Id., at p. 1986.

The response of the House of Representatives to the original draft of Senate Amendment A is particularly telling with respect to the interpretation of § 1-215 because the language at issue in this appeal comes from the significant alterations to Senate Amendment A necessary for the bill to pass that chamber. Significantly, in introducing Senate Amendment A in the House, Representative Ellen Scalettar described it as "virtually the same" as an earlier unsuccessful attempt in that chamber to amend § 1-215, except for the addition of a provision to § 1-210(b)(3) exempting signed witness statements from disclosure. 37 H.R. Proc., Pt. 20, 1994 Sess., pp. 7372-73, 7381-83. In opposing the merits of Senate Amendment A, Representative Dale Radcliffe called it "a distinction without a difference" to earlier unsuccessful legislation, and characterized the existing statute, as interpreted by Gifford, as a "floor" and "not a ceiling" stating that "[i]f the police department chooses to give information over and above that ... which they are required to give, which is fairly extensive... they can. There is nothing prohibiting that."24 Id., at p. 7388. Representative Radcliffe further informed the House that Chief State's Attorney Jack Bailey was "extremely concerned" about Senate Amendment A, observing that its language "require[s]... release[s] of the arrest report and the incident report," which could endanger witnesses and informants, particularly given the time pressures faced by police officers completing such reports.25 (Emphasis added.) Id., at pp. 7388-92.

Representative Scalettar, joined by Representative William Wollenberg, informed the House, however, that Bailey and the state police had subsequently assented to Senate Amendment A subject to an additional amendment, which would add the term "`news release' in the alternative," and provide an "option [to] the police [for] which document" to provide in response to requests. Id., at pp. 7393-95. The House formally introduced such an amendment to House Bill No. 5789 (House Amendment B) later that same day,26 which Representative Scalettar described as "chang[ing] the definition of record of arrest so that it now includes news releases in addition to the information that had been included before, and it makes explicit that the law enforcement agency can designate which of the reports it releases, and it may release any number of the reports, but at least one of them." 37 H.R. Proc., Pt. 21, 1994 Sess., p. 7546. She noted that the change was "intended to clarify the statute, and the requirement that something more than the minimal information be given" — namely, "some narrative ... at the time of the arrest." (Emphasis added.) Id. Representative Wollenberg's comments on House Amendment B further indicate that the post-Gifford amendment of § 1-215 was a compromise measure, which addressed safety concerns at the expense of full disclosure by giving law enforcement agencies far greater discretion than Senate Amendment A had originally provided. See id., at p. 7547 ("I don't expect the [Freedom of Information] award this year"). House Amendment B, ultimately enacted as Public Act 94-246, §§ 13, 14 and 15, then passed that chamber overwhelmingly. Id., at p. 7548.

We conclude that the transcripts of the legislative debate surrounding passage of Public Act 94-24627 do not support the commission's argument that the legislature added the reference to § 1-210(b)(3) in order to eviscerate Gifford in its entirety or amended § 1-215 so that it would be interpreted consistently with the analysis of Justice Berdon's dissenting opinion in Gifford, namely, that § 1-215 is not the exclusive source of law enforcement agencies' disclosure obligations when a criminal prosecution is pending. See footnote 17 of this opinion. First, the legislature did not change the specific language of § 1-215(a) that underlies this particular point in Gifford, namely, its first sentence, "`[n]otwithstanding any provision of the general statutes to the contrary....'" Gifford v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 227 Conn. at 655 n. 15, 631 A.2d 252; Cf. Chief of Police v. Freedom of Information Commission, 252 Conn. 377, 393-96, 746 A.2d 1264 (2000) (noting that, post-Gifford, Public Act 94-246, § 15, changed word "affect" to "limit" in General Statutes § 1-213, with respect to act's effect on discovery, but concluding that change did not alter meaning of statute). Second, there is nothing in the legislative history that demonstrates any disagreement with the Gifford majority's conclusion that § 1-215 is the sole statutory provision governing the disclosure of arrest reports or police reports pursuant to the act while a criminal prosecution is pending. Rather, the legislative history, and especially the comments during the House proceedings, indicates only that the legislature determined that the 1993 revision of § 1-215, as explicated by Gifford, simply did not require the police to disclose a sufficient narrative of the details surrounding an arrest while a prosecution was pending. Finally, during the legislative debates, there was not one mention of Justice Berdon's dissenting opinion or, specifically, his alternate view of the structural relationship between §§ 1-210 and 1-215.

Moreover, the commission's construction of § 1-215 is belied by the addition, through House Amendment B of the statutory language that proved critical to the passage of § 13 of Public Act 94-246, namely, the provision which expressly permits law enforcement agencies to "designate" their disclosure option and, in particular, to craft a "news release" rather than supplying the original arrest or incident reports. Interpreting the act, as the commission urges, to require police disclosure of primary investigative documents, such as original arrest reports or photographs28 during a pending prosecution — even if subject to exemptions under § 1-210(b)(3) — would render superfluous the language contained in § 1-215(b)(2) that gives law enforcement agencies discretion to meet their disclosure obligations under the act by providing secondary source material such as news releases. This, of course, would contravene the "cardinal" maxim that statutes shall not be construed to render any "sentence, clause, or phrase" superfluous or meaningless. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) American Promotional Events, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 285 Conn. 192, 203, 937 A.2d 1184 (2008). Thus, we conclude that the legislative history of Public Act 94-246 demonstrates that the legislature's amendment to § 1-215 was a very limited response to Gifford. See, e.g., Jolly, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 237 Conn. 184, 200-201, 676 A.2d 831 (1996) ("[T]he legislature is presumed to be aware of the interpretation of a statute and ... its subsequent nonaction may be understood as a validation of that interpretation.... This presumption is strengthened when the legislature has affirmatively reenacted the statute after the interpretation in question." [Internal quotation marks omitted.]).

Consistent with the discretion afforded to law enforcement agencies by § 1-215(b)(2), we further conclude that the legislative history supports the department's argument that the reference to § 1-210(b)(3) in § 1-215(a) was only intended to guide law enforcement agencies' compliance with § 1-215(b)(2).29 This limits, then, the commission's authority in this context to ensuring that police departments satisfy their obligations under § 1-215(b)(1) to supply the police blotter information, and § 1-215(b)(2) to provide some meaningful narrative about the arrest, thereby excepting pending prosecutions from the general disclosure obligation imposed by § 1-210(a) of the act, as cabined by the law enforcement exemptions of § 1-210(b)(3). To this end, the legislature's addition of the language in § 1-215(a), providing that "disclosure of data or information other than that set forth" in § 1-215(b)(1) "shall be subject to the provisions" of § 1-210(b)(3), along with language stating that "[a]ny personal possessions or effects found on a person at the time of such person's arrest shall not be disclosed unless such possessions or effects are relevant to the crime for which such person was arrested," was meant only to guide law enforcement agencies in complying with the additional disclosure required by § 1-215(b)(2).30 Accordingly, guided by Gifford, we conclude that law enforcement agencies' disclosure obligations under the act during pending prosecutions remain exclusively governed by § 1-215.31

Insofar as there is no claim that the news release provided by the department did not contain a narrative sufficiently meaningful to satisfy its obligation under § 1-215,32 we conclude that the Appellate Court properly determined that the commission incorrectly found that the department had violated the act in this case.

II

ADMINISTRATIVE DEFERENCE CLAIMS

The commission next claims that its construction of the act with respect to the relationship between §§ 1-210(b)(3) and 1-215, is entitled to deference because it is reasonable and time-tested. The department contends in response that the commission's interpretation is not entitled to deference because the issue presented by this case is a first impression question of statutory construction, involving an unambiguous statute, which raises a pure question of law. The department also contends that any further expansion of the legislature's 1994 response to Gifford requires an additional legislative remedy, given this court's particular hesitation to overrule or modify decisions interpreting statutes. We agree with the department and, accordingly, conclude that the commission's interpretation of the act in this case is not entitled to deference.

"[T]he traditional deference accorded to an agency's interpretation of a statutory term is unwarranted when the construction of a statute ... has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny [or to]... a governmental agency's time-tested interpretation.... Conversely, an agency's interpretation of a statute is accorded deference when the agency's interpretation has been formally articulated and applied for an extended period of time, and that interpretation is reasonable.... Deference is warranted in such circumstances because a time-tested interpretation, like judicial review, provides an opportunity for aggrieved parties to contest that interpretation. Moreover, in certain circumstances, the legislature's failure to make changes to a long-standing agency interpretation implies its acquiescence to the agency's construction of the statute.... For these reasons, this court long has adhered to the principle that when a governmental agency's time-tested interpretation [of a statute] is reasonable it should be accorded great weight by the courts." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tuxis Ohr's Fuel, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 309 Conn. 412, 422-23, 72 A.3d 13 (2013), quoting Longley v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 284 Conn. 149, 163-64, 931 A.2d 890 (2007); see also Dept. of Public Safety v. State Board of Labor Relations, supra, 296 Conn. at 600-601, 996 A.2d 729.

In determining whether an administrative agency's interpretation is reasonable, we conduct a searching inquiry of that construction, which is not limited to determining whether the statutory text is ambiguous for purposes of § 1-2z. See Stec v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 299 Conn. 346, 360-71, 10 A.3d 1 (2010) (conducting extensive examination of plain language of workers' compensation appeals statute, General Statutes § 31-301[a], its relationship to related statutes, legislative history, and public policy in concluding that compensation review board's interpretation of appeal period as jurisdictional "is both time-tested and reasonable and therefore entitled to deference"); Dept. of Public Safety v. State Board of Labor Relations, supra, 296 Conn. at 599, 996 A.2d 729 ("We also must determine whether the [board's] interpretation is reasonable.... In so doing, we apply our established rules of statutory construction." [Internal quotation marks omitted.]). Put differently, the agency's construction does not, without more, operate to "break a tie" upon a determination that a statute is ambiguous for purposes of § 1-2z.

Assuming, without deciding, that the commission's construction of the relevant language of § 1-215 on six occasions in the nineteen years since the enactment of Public Act 94-246 is time-tested,33 we conclude that that interpretation is not reasonable in light of the ample extratextual evidence discussed previously in this opinion. Accordingly, we decline to defer to the commission's construction, which undercuts the legislature's intent to respond to Gifford by providing only for limited additional disclosure during a pending prosecution, in the form of a meaningful narrative, to be furnished at the law enforcement agency's discretion.

Finally, the commission and the amici suggest numerous salutary effects of requiring greater disclosure under the act by law enforcement agencies in the context of pending prosecutions, including preventing harassment and discrimination,34 some of which were noted by Senator Jepsen in his remarks in support of the bill that was enacted as Public Act 94-246. See footnote 23 of this opinion. The commission also appears to suggest that the obligations imposed by § 1-215, namely, "bare police blotter information and a press release," apply only "at the time of the arrest. They are not required to disclose the entire incident report or arrest report, although they may elect to do so. Subsequently, all other requests for records are subject to the rather protective provisions of § 1-210(b)(3)." This approach, which might well be reasonable and salutary as a policy matter, nevertheless is inconsistent with the existing statutory scheme under § 1-215, read in light of Gifford v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 227 Conn. at 641, 631 A.2d 252, which exclusively governs, and does not set forth a specific time line for the disclosure of law enforcement records during pending prosecutions. Given the continuing vigorous legislative debate on open government matters both in 1994 and today, we deem balancing the various interests and articulating a coherent policy on this matter to be a uniquely legislative function. The General Assembly retains the prerogative to modify or clarify § 1-215 as it sees fit.35

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.